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Abstract Over the last decade, several European coun-
tries and the Council of Europe itself have strongly sup-
ported the use of advance directives as a means of
protecting patients’ autonomy, and adopted specific norms
to regulate this matter. However, it remains unclear under
which conditions those regulations should apply to people
who are placed in correctional settings. The issue is
becoming more significant due to the increasing numbers
of inmates of old age or at risk of suffering from mental
disorders, all of whom might benefit from using advance
directives. At the same time, the closed nature of prisons
and the disparate power relationships that characterise
them mean that great caution must be exercised to prevent
care being withdrawn or withheld from inmates who
actually want to receive it. This paper explores the issue of
prisoners’ advance directives in the European context,
starting with the position enshrined in international and
European law that prisoners retain all their human rights,
except the right to liberty, and are therefore entitled to self-
determination regarding health care decisions.
Keywords Advance directives  Prison  Self-
determination  Ageing  Mental incapacity
A growing prison population with specific health care
needs
In many countries, the number of prisoners who are elderly
and/or suffering from mental disorders is steadily growing
(Aday and Krabill 2012). The current situation is expected
to worsen over the next few decades posing a serious
challenge to prison authorities, who have an obligation to
provide adequate healthcare to inmates. From the per-
spective of international human rights law, it is clear that
prisoners retain all their fundamental rights except the right
to liberty, although such rights may be subject to certain
restrictions that are unavoidable in a closed environment
(UN Human Rights Committee 1992, para. 3; European
Court of Human Rights 2004, para. 50). Prisoners also
retain their entitlement to access to healthcare, as well as
the right to decide autonomously whether to accept or
refuse a given treatment. There is no reason to deny them
this right simply because they are in a penal institution. The
main aims of prisons are punishment, rehabilitation and
deterrence. Punishment means the restriction of liberty, it
does not mean to let inmates get or remain sick, or to deny
them the rights enjoyed by all citizens regarding health
care decisions. Interference with these latter rights can
even amount to inhuman or degrading treatment or torture,
a violation of article three of the European Convention on
Human Rights (Council of Europe 1950; Elger 2008b).
In this context, advance directives have the potential to
enhance the self-determination of elderly prisoners and those
at higher risk of developing mental disorders. These direc-
tives are statements that people make about their wishes
regarding future provision, withholding or withdrawal of
particular treatments in the event that they become unable to
make decisions at some point. Over the last decade, attention
in Europe has increasingly focused on the positive role that
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advance directives can play in promoting and protecting
patients’ autonomy. A number of countries have passed
specific laws to regulate this matter and to determine the
conditions under which advance directives can be legally
binding (Andorno et al. 2009; Negri 2011; Goffin 2012). In
some countries, such as the UK and Germany, even before
the adoption of specific laws on thematter, the jurisprudence
had stressed the binding nature of anticipatory treatment
refusals (Jox et al. 2008). The Council of Europe has also in
recent years made important steps to encourage Member
States to facilitate the use of advance directives (Andorno
2013, pp. 195–214).
However, it is still unclear to what extent the general
rules governing advance directives apply to individuals in
correctional settings. The existing norms on the matter
remain silent in this regard. Given the naturally coercive
environment in which prisoners are placed, the criteria for
valid advance directives need to be specifically discussed.
To this end, this paper first presents the scope of advance
directives and the general conditions for their validity.
Then, it emphasizes the principle of equivalence of health
care, and finally discusses the elements that need to be
specifically considered when assessing the validity of
advance directives made by prisoners.
Advance directives: a tool of self-determination
In modern medical ethics and law it is firmly established
that patients have the right to accept or refuse any medical
treatment that they are offered. Respect for patients’
autonomy is the foundation of the informed consent
requirement, but also ensure that patients can reject treat-
ment, even if this decision might lead to death.
However, a problem arises when patients have lost their
decision-making capacity due to a condition that is not
likely to be reversible (e.g. persistent vegetative state,
coma, severe head injury, dementia, etc.). What criteria
should be used to make a decision in these situations? What
if family members disagree about which treatment should
be provided? What if doctors and relatives have different
views regarding which treatments are excessive or futile?
During the last few decades, policymakers and aca-
demics have drawn attention to the potential utility of
advance directives in solving these dilemmas. Advance
directives enable patients to declare in advance their
preferences regarding the provision, withholding or with-
drawal of specified medical treatments (a living will), or to
empower a trusted individual to make such decisions on
their behalf (durable power of attorney), or to combine
both these options. Usually, advance directives take the
form of a treatment refusal, not of a request for a specific
therapy. Treatment requests are obviously not binding for
health care professionals, but can nevertheless help them to
determine what is in the best interests of the patient.
These statements can be regarded as a ‘‘logical exten-
sion of patient self-determination’’ (Stewart 2007, p. 39). If
decisions regarding treatments can be made contempora-
neously, there is no reason why they cannot be made with
the intention that they will come into effect in the future,
should the patient become incompetent. In other words,
advance directives provide patients with a very concrete
tool to continue exercising their autonomy even if they lose
decision-making capacity. While the immediate justifica-
tion of advance health care decisions is respect for patient
autonomy, it can be argued that their ultimate rationale
rests upon the principles of beneficence and nonmalefi-
cence, as they can contribute to patients’ good by enabling
them to refuse treatments that they believe would be more
harmful than helpful.
Advance directives have traditionally been conceived to
contribute to the decision-making process in situations
where patients have lost consciousness. However, they can
also be used when future mental incapacity is foreseen or
feared due to some genetic predisposition or when the
initial symptoms of a mental illness (for instance, Alzhei-
mer’s disease) are already being experienced. In such sit-
uations, advance decisions may cover future medical
treatments in general, or be specifically focused on mental
health treatments. In this second case, they are called
‘‘psychiatric advance directives’’ (PAD). Unlike general
advance directives, which are normally used to refuse
medical interventions, PADs can also have a positive
scope, giving prior consent to a particular future psychiatric
treatment or measure. This enables those caring for patients
with PADs to avoid the lengthy legal processes that are
otherwise required in order to determine what a patient
would have wanted (Thomas and Watson 1998; Scheyett
et al. 2010).
As mentioned above, a number of European countries
have passed specific laws to regulate advance directives,
and to establish the conditions for their validity and exe-
cution. Among the conditions they consider essential are
the following:
(a) The individual must have all the necessary informa-
tion to make an advance decision, just as all patients
must have sufficient information to provide informed
consent in the normal clinical context. The Mental
Capacity Act Code of Practice (UK Department for
Constitutional Affairs 2007) says that those helping
people make decisions must ask ‘‘Does the person
have all the relevant information they need to make a
particular decision?’’ (Section 3) In the context of
advance directives, the question becomes ‘‘Did the
person have all the necessary information when the
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directive was created?’’ Where circumstances change
significantly and these changes were not anticipated at
the time the directive was created (see (d) below), it
will be clear in some cases that the person did not have
sufficient information about the future circumstances
for the directive to be applicable.
(b) The individual must have been competent to make
the directive at the time it was made. The crucial
issue is whether the person was able to understand
the nature and scope of the specified treatments
when he or she made the decision. This capacity
does not need to be proved: every adult is presumed
to have capacity, but this presumption can be
rebutted by evidence to the contrary.
(c) The individual must have been free to make the
decision, i.e. no coercion or undue influence was
exerted upon him or her. In this regard, in a famous
judgement issued in 1992, a British court stated that
the advance refusal of blood transfusion by a woman
who was severely injured in a car accident was
invalid because her mother, who was a Jehovah’s
Witness, exerted undue pressure on her to make her
refuse the treatment prior to her becoming uncon-
scious (England and Wales Court of Appeal, Civil
Division 1992).
(d) There are no serious reasons to believe that the
patient would have a different view had he or she had
adequate knowledge of the current circumstances.
Basically, this requires the advance directive to have
been intended to cover the situation that has arisen.
This requirement can be found, in similar terms, in
various European national laws. For instance, the
new Article 372.2 of the Swiss Civil Code provides
that ‘‘the physician must respect the patient’s
advance directives, unless (…) serious doubts can
be raised as to whether they are the expression of the
patient’s free will or whether they are in conformity
with the presumed will of the patient in the current
situation’’; the UK Mental Capacity Act of 2005
requires the absence of ‘‘reasonable grounds for
believing that circumstances exist which the person
did not anticipate and which would have affected his
decision had he anticipated them’’ (Section 25.4.c);
Article 1901a of the German Civil Code requires that
the specifications in the advance directives should be
‘‘in accordance with the current living and treatment
condition of the patient’’.
(e) The wishes formulated in the advance directives are
not contrary to the law. For instance, a request for
active euthanasia would be illegal in most countries.
Similarly, basic or essential care (warmth, shelter,
hygiene measures, and the offer of oral food and
water) are excluded from the scope of advance
directives as they are not considered ‘‘medical
treatments’’ (See, for instance, UK Code of Practice
for the Mental Capacity Act, Section 9.28; Kletecka-
Pulker 2007, p. 82).
Furthermore, the Council of Europe has made significant
efforts to raise awareness among Member States about the
need to promote patient autonomy by means of advance
directives (including both living wills and powers of
attorney). The first important step in this regard was made
in 1997 with the adoption of the European Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine (‘‘Oviedo Convention’’),
which explicitly recognizes the value of advance
directives:
The previously expressed wishes relating to a medical
intervention by a patient who is not, at the time of the
intervention, in a state to express his or her wishes
shall be taken into account (Article 9).
In 2009, the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers
adopted the Recommendation (2009) 11 on ‘‘continuing
powers of attorney and advance directives for incapacity’’,
which develops in more detail the formalities for making
advance directives, with a particular focus on the possibil-
ity of appointing a health care proxy, which was absent
from the Oviedo Convention. On 25 January 2012, the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
approved the Resolution 1859 (2012) on ‘‘Protecting
human rights and dignity by taking into account previously
expressed wishes of patients’’, which encourages Member
States that have not yet done so to implement the European
standards concerning continuing powers of attorney and
advance directives for incapacity and to review any
relevant legislation.
The principle of equivalence of health care
The idea that prisoners should enjoy a standard of health-
care that is equivalent to that provided in the wider com-
munity has been termed ‘‘the principle of equivalence’’.
This principle is enshrined in several international human
rights instruments, such as the United Nations (1990) Basic
Principles for the Treatment of Prisoners, which states:
‘‘Prisoners shall have access to the health services available
in the country without discrimination on the grounds of
their legal situation’’ (Principle 9). At the European level,
the Council of Europe (1998) recommendation concerning
the ethical and organizational aspects of health care in
prison provides that health care services should be pro-
vided ‘‘in conditions comparable to those enjoyed by the
general public’’ (Article 10). In summary, the principle of
equivalence embodies the idea that ‘‘the fact that people
are in prison does not mean that they have any reduced
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right to appropriate health care’’ (Coyle 2007, p. 7). Since
the state has deprived those individuals of their liberty, it
should take on a special responsibility to ensure that they
have access to adequate health care services (Elger 2008a,
b, 2011).
However, it must be acknowledged that the ethical
principles governing access to health care services cannot
always operate in the context of a prison. The security
objectives of correctional settings may enter into conflict
with respect for patient autonomy as it is usually under-
stood outside the prison walls. An example of this is the
impossibility for prisoners to enjoy the benefit of a real free
choice of a physician. Prisoners may refuse the care offered
by the prison’s doctor, and may sometimes be visited by an
external doctor or, in some special circumstances, attend a
consultation outside the prison, but they cannot undertake
regular treatment from a doctor they would have chosen
outside the prison (Niveau 2007). More importantly,
especially in urgent cases, a detainee cannot just visit an
emergency department him- or herself, but needs first to
convince prison guards that the matter is sufficiently urgent
to call the nurse or physician. However, beyond the inev-
itable restrictions that are inherent to the structure and
scope of correctional settings, it is a requirement of human
rights law and of the ethical principle of justice that pris-
oners are entitled to the same rights regarding healthcare
decisions as are accorded to any other competent adult
patient in the wider community.
Advance directives in prison
If the principle of equivalence is taken seriously, there is no
reason to deny prisoners the right to create advance
directives in order to ensure that their preferences regard-
ing healthcare are respected. However, the specific cir-
cumstances of imprisonment must be taken into account
when assessing the execution of advance directives created
in prison, or which were made before imprisonment but
which take effect in prison. Two situations must be clearly
distinguished:
Advance directives made before imprisonment
Incarceration represents a dramatic change in any indi-
vidual’s life, and is likely to have a significant impact on
his or her attitude towards life, death, and healthcare
preferences. Therefore, there are serious reasons for argu-
ing that advance directives made before imprisonment are
no longer valid, although they could sometimes provide a
useful indicator of individual preferences. As already
mentioned, the information criterion for consent applies
equally to the creation and enforcement of advance
directives. This poses a particular problem for the use of
pre-existing directives in prisons, for two reasons. First,
many prisoners will never have anticipated their arrest,
conviction and imprisonment, all of which constitute
essential information that the prisoner lacked at the time of
making the directive. The fundamental life change repre-
sented by imprisonment would appear to render many such
directives invalid. For example, in the UK, the Mental
Capacity Act Code of Practice states that ‘‘To be applica-
ble, an advance decision must apply to the situation in
question and in the current circumstances’’ (Section 9.41).
However, it is questionable whether any directive made
without the knowledge that imprisonment would occur
could meet this criterion. More generally, ‘‘It remains
unclear whether a person who has never been imprisoned at
all, or even prisoners who have not been incarcerated in a
particular facility, would ever be able to evaluate correctly
in advance how they would feel in that particular future
situation.’’ (Elger 2014).
In any case, it would be advisable that the individual
entering into prison either confirms or modifies any pre-
vious healthcare instructions in order to adapt them to the
new circumstances. Theoretically, it would be different if
the person had foreseen future imprisonment in the
advance directive and included explicit instructions relat-
ing to healthcare in prison, inasmuch as he or she was able
to correctly judge in advance the living conditions in a
correctional setting. But in practice it is very unlikely that
the possibility of a future imprisonment would be men-
tioned in a directive, not least for the reason that such
sensitive information could be shared and lead to stigma-
tization of the individual (Elger 2014).
Advance directives made during imprisonment
As in the general population, the great majority of people
entering prison are not likely to have an advance directive.
Therefore, health care professionals will be normally
confronted with instructions made during imprisonment
when assessing whether a given advance directive meets
the criteria for validity in a penal institutions.
Among the five conditions mentioned above for the
validity of advance directives, two are particularly impor-
tant in the case of patient-prisoners: their competence at the
time the directive was made, and their freedom from any
form of coercion or deception.
Competence
It is well known that imprisonment can have a damaging
effect on mental health, particularly in the case of long
term sentences (WHO-ICRC 2006). From a global per-
spective, it has been reported that at least half of the nine
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million people detained in penal institutions around the
world suffer from personality disorders, and one million
prisoners or more worldwide suffer from serious mental
disorders such as psychosis or depression (Blaauw and
Marle 2007, p. 133). This is why special care must be taken
when assessing whether inmates have the necessary deci-
sion-making capacity to give healthcare instructions in
advance. This point is crucial because new advance
directives cannot be created by individuals who are already
incapable of giving valid consent; in such cases consent or
refusal must be obtained from a person authorized to make
decisions on behalf of the patient, taking into account his or
her best interests.
The initial assumption must be that inmates are com-
petent and that they are therefore able to give instructions
about their future health care. The fact that the proportion
of people suffering from mental disorders is higher in
prison than among the general population is not a sufficient
reason for denying them decision-making capacity. How-
ever, the increased prevalence of psychiatric disease in
prisons does mean that prison physicians must be particu-
larly careful when examining the competence of each
individual (Elger 2014).
In addition, it should be noticed that mental capacity is
not a matter of all or nothing; there are degrees of com-
petence. Prisoners with a particular mental disorder and
those suffering from senility are not automatically exclu-
ded from giving valid informed consent to a medical
treatment. The individual’s capacity should be assessed
specifically on a case by case basis rather than by making
inferences from the general features implied by a particular
diagnosis (Van Staden and Krüger 2003). Thus, the crucial
issue is whether inmates (even if mentally ill) still have the
ability to understand, deliberate upon, and reach conclu-
sions regarding healthcare, and to express their wishes
about possible treatments. The prison physician plays a key
role in the assessment of prisoners’ competence.
A specific dilemma posed by a person with incapaci-
tating mental illness is what to do if, at the time of the
execution of the instructions, the current wishes of the
mentally incompetent individual contradict those expressed
in his or her directive. This issue becomes particularly
dramatic in the case of life-sustaining treatments that that
the individual would like to continue, but which were
rejected in the advance directive. Ronald Dworkin solves
this dilemma by giving priority to so-called ‘‘precedent
autonomy’’, which means that the current wishes of the
incompetent patient can be simply ignored. He grounds this
conclusion by prioritizing what he calls a person’s ‘‘critical
interests’’, or meaningful life goals and projects, over
‘‘experiential interests’’, or desires to have enjoyable
experiences, even if the person has become unaware of her
critical interests (1994, p. 226). Rebecca Dresser has
levelled a number of objections against Dworkin’s theory.
For instance, she claims that the authors of an advance
refusal of treatment may be unaware of the threat to their
future welfare if the directive is implemented: ‘‘people may
be mistaken about their future experiential interests as
incompetent individuals’’. This is one of the reasons why,
in her view, autonomy should not have primacy over the
duty to protect the welfare of incompetent patients and to
treat them with compassion (Dresser 1995). Similarly, it
has been argued that ‘‘if a patient is still enjoying life or is
showing a clear will to live, it would be unthinkable to
implement the advance directive according to this current/
future best interests-standard’’ (Lemmens 2012, p. 183) and
that ‘‘there can be cases in medical practice (…) in which it
is justified to violate the mandate of autonomy in favour of
the well-being of the dementia patient’’ (Vollmann 2001).
Likewise, the German Ethics Council has stated that an
advance refusal cannot be implemented if the incompetent
patient clearly shows a ‘‘will to live’’ (Lebenswillen). In
this regard, all forms of expression of such a will to live,
including non-verbal ones, have to be taken into account.
(2012, p. 89).
Freedom
The second crucial criterion that must be met for an
advance directive to be valid is that its author was free
from any form of coercion or deception at the time the
directive was made. This criterion guarantees the volun-
tariness of any decisions documented in the directive. This
condition is not to be taken for granted in a correctional
setting. The disparate power relationships and the closed
nature of the prison environment do not facilitate the
exercise of prisoners’ autonomy regarding health care.
Inmates are accustomed to simply following orders, to
conforming to the rules of the institution, and to avoid
taking the initiative on virtually any relevant issue. In this
context, it is not only difficult for them to make autono-
mous decisions about health care, but also challenging to
even be aware that they have a right to accept or reject
treatment. The simple fact that prison guards are the
gatekeepers of health services means that in countries
where the principle of equivalence as well as the inde-
pendence of health care professionals and confidentiality
are not respected, it is often very difficult or impossible to
distinguish between refusal of care and denial of care
(Dubler 1998).
The risk of coercion by prison staff must be taken into
account when assessing the validity of advance directives
made in prison. Prison authorities may be tempted to put
pressure on prisoners to make them refuse treatment, either
for budgetary reasons, or in order to exonerate the penal
institution from any responsibility in case fragile inmates
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die as a result of inadequate health care. As Thomas and
Watson (1998) point out, the use of advance directives in
penal settings can enable inmates to exercise their auton-
omy regarding treatment, but also introduces the potential
for yet another form of coercion against prisoners, partic-
ularly those who are more vulnerable. The danger is that
advance directives could be misused by prison authorities
to deny care to prisoners who have not chosen to reject it
(Dubler 1998).
Another risk is that prison staff may exert pressure on
inmates to accept medical treatments that they sincerely do
not want. This coercion could be motivated by the desire to
prevent any suspicion that prisoners did not receive
equivalent healthcare, especially if death may result from a
lack of treatment. It must be remembered that the European
Court of Human Rights has repeatedly declared that the
lack of appropriate health care for sick prisoners is a form
of inhuman or degrading treatment, which is condemned by
Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(European Court of Human Rights. Press Unit 2012).
Another difficult dilemma relates to the intention that
may lead prisoners to reject medical treatments. What if the
prisoner’s refusal (particularly in the case of life-threaten-
ing problems) is not motivated by the rejection of the
treatment itself, but is the result of a depressive state of
mind caused by poor living conditions in prison? What if
the prospect of remaining in prison for many years leads
them to reject any future medical intervention in order to
die as soon as possible? In such situations, a delicate bal-
ance is to be struck between the duty of prison authorities
to respect inmates’ health care preferences and the equally
important duty to prevent suicides among prisoners.
But how can it be established whether the main
motivation for treatment refusal are the poor living con-
ditions in prison? How to determine whether the inmate
would have accepted the proposed treatment if he or she
were outside the penal institution? Once again, the
independence and professional skills of the prison phy-
sician are crucial here. Doctors are called to engage an
open dialogue with prisoners at the time they make an
advance directive, explaining them the different treat-
ments, exploring their real preferences regarding future
medical interventions in case of future incapacity, and
evaluating the authenticity of their wishes. If the doctor
comes to the conclusion that the advance refusal of care
is genuine, he or she should respect the directive once the
time to use it arrives. However, if the doctor believes
sincerely that the treatment refusal is mainly motivated
by a wish to die in order to ‘‘escape’’ from prison, and not
by a rejection of the treatment itself, then he or she would
probably need to adopt a more proactive approach. In
such situations, the role of physicians should be to dis-
suade prisoners from misusing the tool of advance
directives for committing suicide, and trying to help them
to overcome the depression. In the case of prisoners
diagnosed with short term fatal diseases, authorities are
obliged to examine the possibility of humanitarian release
or pardon, which would permit detainees to die with
dignity outside of the prison context (Council of Europe
1998, para. 51).
The independence of prison physicians from prison
authorities is essential to prevent a misuse of advance
directives and to determine whether prisoners’ instructions
are genuine, and not the result of any form of pressure or
manipulation by the prison staff. This can be facilitated by
establishing close links between prison physicians and
public health authorities, and by transferring prison health
services to the general health services of the country and
making them independent from the government agency
responsible for the prisons. In France, for instance, legis-
lation was introduced in 1994 placing prison health under
the General Health Directorate for public health issues in
the Ministry of Health. In England and Wales, the
responsibility and also the budget for prison health care
was transferred to the National Health Service in 2002
(Coyle 2007, p. 9).
Conclusion
Prisoners have a right to a standard of medical care which
is equivalent to that provided in the wider community.
They also retain their entitlement to autonomy regarding
health care decisions. If these principles are taken seri-
ously, then there are a priori no reasons why prisoners
should not benefit from the possibility of making health
care decisions in advance.
Over the last decade, many European institutions have
given a strong impetus to the use of advance directives,
either in the form of living wills, of continuing powers of
attorney, or of a combination of both. We have clarified the
circumstances in which the use of advance directives is
appropriate in the context of prisons and prisoners. The
three most important elements to consider are the quality
and relevance of the information provided, the mental
competence of the prisoner, and his or her freedom from
any form of coercion or deception at the time the directive
was made.
While advance directives can play a positive role in
enabling prisoners to continue exercising their autonomy
once they lose decision-making capacity, they can also
provide an opportunity for abuse of the most vulnerable
inmates. Great care must be exercised to guarantee that
prisoners are mentally competent at the time they give their
instructions, and that they are free to express their genuine
wishes.
38 R. Andorno et al.
123
References
Aday, R., and J. Krabill. 2012. Older and geriatric offenders: Critical
issues for the 21st Century. In Special needs offenders in
correctional institutions, ed. L. Gideon, 203–232. Los Angeles:
Sage Publications.
Andorno, R., N. Biller-Andorno, and S. Brauer. 2009. Advance health
care directives: Towards a coordinated European policy? Euro-
pean Journal of Health Law 16(3): 207–227.
Andorno, R. 2013. Principles of international biolaw. Seeking
common ground at the intersection of bioethics and human
rights. Brussels: Bruylant.
Blaauw, E., and H. van Marle. 2007. Mental health in prisons. In
Health in prisons: A WHO guide to the essentials in prison
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